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Abstract
This paper uses an endogenous growth model to examine the interaction between trade, economic
growth, and the environment. We find that whether trade enhances or retards growth depends on the
relation between factor intensities of exportable, importable,  and R&D and the relative abundance
of the factor R&D uses more intensively. Depending on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
the long-run rate of economic growth changes with environmental externalities.  Concerns about the
environment  can  explain  a  significant  part  of cross-country  difference  in growth  rates.  For the
empirically reported range of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,  countries which care more
about the environment  grow faster. The effects of trade on the environment  and welfare depend  on
the elasticities of supply for the two traded goods, the terms of trade effect on growth, and pollution
intensities.  The decentralized  and Pareto optimal growth rates are, in general, different.  The market
growth rate is bigger than the optimal rate the larger the degree of monopoly power in the innovation
sector and the stronger the  effects  of environmental  externalities.  The policy implications  of this
divergence  are discussed.  We also consider  numerical exercises  to broaden the insights from the
analytical results and allow for incorporating pollution abatement (Journal  ofEconomic Literature
Classification Numbers: F11,  031,  041, Q20).
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The new growth theory has succeeded to a large extent in accounting for many of (what Kaldor,
1961,  and others call ) the "stylized" facts of economic growth.'  However, it ignores altogether the
interaction between growth and environment. 2 If what motivates the study of growth is its implication
on welfare, then there is a strong motivation  for studying environmental externalities because they
have direct and indirect  welfare effects.  The direct effects are related to the harm on human health
and the damage  to the  amenity value  of the environment.  The  indirect  effects  are the  reduced
productivity impacts of global warming, desertification,  deforestation,  etc. Substantial evidence  has
been  gathered  on these  effects  (e.g.,  see  the World  Bank,  1992).  Many of these  environmental
problems are blamed on the process of economic growth. Needless to emphasize, the omission of
environment would have serious implications on the predictions of the new growth theory. Moreover,
environmental  policies have never been analyzed in this framework.
Parallel to the new growth theory, a large body of literature on modeling the linkages between
growth and environment  has accumulated. These models suffer from at least two limitations.  First,
they ignore  innovations,  the engine  of growth, and trade.  According  to Grossman  and Helpman
(1994)  "a story of growth that neglects technological progress is both ahistorical and implausible"  (p.
26). Because they ignore innovations and their positive  spillover effects on production, the common
result from these models is that optimal preservation of environmental quality and economic growth
'Contributions to this theory are made by Romer (1986,  1990), Lucas (1988),  Grossman and Helpman (1991 a),
Rebelo (1991)  and others. Part of this literature is surveyed by Sala-i-Martin  (1990), Helpman (1992),  and Lucas (1993).
See also Grossman and Helpman (1994), Romer (1994),  and Solow  (1994)  for a review.
2There are few exceptions, however. Hung, Victor, and Blackburn (1993), Bovenberg and Smulders (1993),  and
Marrewijk, Ploeg, and Verbeek (1993)  are examples of studies that attempt to incorporate environment into endogenous
growth models. Our model structure is completely different from theirs. Besides they do not consider trade in their models.
1are competitive objectives.  This result is in contradiction with what many economists believe (e.g.,
see World Bank,  1992). Second, they tend to place emphasis on analyzing optimal growth only  (even
though economies  do not behave optimally) rather than also considering a market  driven dynamic
equilibrium.3 Studies that use market analysis concentrate on the cost of environmental  policy and
ignore externalities which are at the heart of  environmental  economics.4
These gaps need to be filled. We need to have a better understanding of the linkages between
innovations,  trade, economic growth, and environmental quality. In other words, we are in need of
a framework that integrates the theory of endogenous economic growth, the theory of international
trade, and environmental economics. It should enable us to answer questions like the following. What
are the implications of introducing environmental considerations in a standard endogenous growth
model? Does environment  slow or accelerate growth? What are the repercussions of trade? Dose
trade liberalization increases the long-run rate of economic growth? Dose it improve or worsen the
quality of the environment?  Is trade welfare improving  as it is oftentimes  true  in the absence  of
environmental externalities?  Faced with environmental  externalities, how can an economy optimally
innovate and grow over time? Is a competitive equilibrium Pareto optimal and, if not, what are the
policy implications? Are there first-best  policies? If first best policies are not available, would there
be second-best policies?
This paper attempts to model the link between innovations, trade, growth, and environmental
'Examples from this category are: Keeler, Spence, and Zechkauser (1971); D'Arge and Kogiku (1972); Gruuver
(1976);  Krautkraemer (1985);  and Nordhaus (1991a,  1991b,  1992,  1993). An exception is Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen
(1993)  who analyze competitive equilibrium. In  their model, however, technological change and trade issues are ignored.
4Examples are: Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990a,  1990b,  1993a, 1993b), Blitzer et al. (1993), Manne and Richels
(1990), Burniaux et al. (1992). There is also a growing literature on the empirical aspects of growth and environment nexus.
(See for example Grossman and Krueger (1993,  1994), Skafik and Bandyopadhyay,  1992). One major limitation of this work
is that the estimated relationship is not derivable from a theoretical model.
2quality. For this purpose we develop a multi-sectoral endogenous growth model that can be used to
address the questions raised above. The model is in the tradition of the new growth theory specially
the recent work of Grossman and Helpman (1991a,  199 1b),  Romer (1989,  1990),  and Rivera-Batiz
and Romer  (1991).  It has the following features.  First, the model  depicts a  small open economy.
There  are two traded goods  and  all factors  of production  are not traded  internationally.  Second,
technological change expands the range of intermediate inputs available in the market and is generated
endogenously.  There are also technological  spillovers that facilitate invention of new designs. Third,
inventors are granted infinitely-lived patents and thereby earn monopoly profits. Fourth, the model
incorporates the welfare effects of environmental quality and its relation to pollution and abatement
activities.  Fifth,  it  permits  analyzing  the  effects  of environmental  policy  and  other  policies  on
economic growth.
The presence of environmental externalities makes a difference in the results that emerge from
standard endogenous  growth models.  Growth models which ignore the effects of the environment
on welfare produce  different growth rates than those that incorporate environmental  externalities.
Whether  these  growth  rates  are  smaller  or  larger  depends  on  the  elasticity  of intertemporal
substitution. The equilibrium and optimal growth rates are, in general,  different.  This is an expected
result in view of  the many externalities considered.  Unlike other models of endogenous technological
change with knowledge spillovers, which  suggest the competitive  equilibrium growth rate is always
below  the  Pareto  optimal  one,  and  in  contrast  to  environment-growth  models,  which put  the
decentralized  growth  rate  above  the  optimal  rate,  the  results  of our  model  depend  on  certain
conditions.  If they  are  not  satisfied,  the  opposite  result  will  be  obtained.  Naturally,  the  policy
implications are different in each case. In one knife-edge case there is no need for policy intervention.We  explore  several  policies  that  could  align the two growth  paths.  Whether trade enhances  or
frustrates growth depends  on the relation between factor intensities of the two final output sectors
and that of the research and development sector and the relative abundance of  the factor that R&D
uses more intensively. The effects of trade on environment and welfare are ambiguous.  They depend
on a number of conditions that will be shown.
The paper is organized as follows.  The model is presented in Section II. The "competitive"
equilibrium and the determinants of sustained growth are derived in Section III. We also study the
effects of consumers' attitude toward the environment  on growth. In Section IV, the solution to a
social  planner's  problem  is discussed  and compared  to the market  solution.  We  also derive  the
conditions under which the two solutions are different.  Section V focuses on how intervention  can
secure optimal allocations of resources.
The model of Section II assumes firms cannot control pollution even if they wish to. Section
VI extends this model to incorporate the ability of firms to control pollution. In this model there is
an effluent  charge on pollution emitted into the environment.  Technological  knowledge reduces the
cost of controlling pollution. Because of the difficulty of finding analytical  solutions, we solve the
model numerically. In Section VII we summarize our results and provide concluding remarks.
II. The Model
The economy  is small in the sense of being unable to influence its terms of trade. It produces two
commodities using two primary factors of production, a set of differentiated  intermediate inputs, and
new designs to produce these differentiated  inputs. While the two commodities are allowed to freely
move across the borders of this country, primary and intermediate inputs are immobile. New designsare assumed to be nontradable. We will also assume that exchange of knowledge  is not possible.
Consumers. There are many identical infinitely-lived consumers who get utility from the two traded
goods and the environment.  Momentary utility of a representative consumer is given by5
(C  ' C l-.  Q90  - 1 {  (C  :+CI-*)Q")1 -1-I,  for  0 < o <  0  o  1 -,  =-  1  -a(1)
4 log  Cy + (1- 0)  log  C,  + plog  Q,  for  o  =  I
0  . 4  :  1,  A  O0  4 (1-oa)<  1, pl(-o)  <  1,
where Ci is consumption of commodity i (i = Z, Y) and Q is a variable measuring the quality of the
environment and will be described in  more details later.  Throughout this paper all Greek letters and
A's are parameters.  All  other variables  should be thought of as functions of time unless otherwise
noted. We drop the time symbol to simplify the exposition. Consumers are endowed with two primary
factors of production,  capital (K) and labor (L) whose supply is  fixed every period6.
Final  output sectors.  There are two sectors that produce final output. Each sector consists of a large
number of identical firms. At the beginning of each period they rent labor and capital from consumers,
and a set of differentiated inputs from the intermediate inputs sectors. Production functions of the two
traded goods are given by
Y=A  K,'L £D,  A  >0,  a  = 1,  >0,  = 1,2,3  (2)
L-1
5This utility function exhibits the following properties (i) the elasticity of the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption  and environmental quality with respect to consumption,  [alog (U6/U,  )/ alog Cj, is equal to one; (ii) the
elasticity  of the marginal  utility of consuming  commodity i is constant;  (iii)  the  elasticity of the  marginal utility of
environmental quality is constant and equal to 1-(1-a); and (iv) it satisfies Inada conditions: lim  U,  = °, lim  U,  = 0,
lim  UQ =  , and lim  UQ = 0. This is the only functional form compatible with steady state.  C i-0  co
Q-o  Q-
6Elbasha (1995)  analyzes the implications of environmental externalities in three classes of endogenous growth
models that allow factor accumulation. All these are, however, closed economy models.
5z  A.KP'L.PD  A.0,  . 1,  > 0, i = 1. 2  3,  (3)
it-
where K,  is capital used in producing commodity i, Li is labor used in the production of good i, and
Di (i = y, z) denotes an index of differentiated inputs and is determined  according to7
D,=  [fX  )bdj],  0 < 6 < 1,  (4)
where M(t) denotes the measure (number)  of differentiated products available at time t and X(j) is
the amount of differentiated input j. The set of brands available at time t, {i: i e  [0, M(t)]},  is assumed
to be continuous. We also assume that both commodities Y and Z have the same intensity in D (i.e.
a3 = 03 3). This, together with the constant returns to scale restrictions, imply c( + a2 =  P1  + P2.
Intermediate inputs Sectors. Each brand j  e [0, M(t)] of differentiated  inputs is produced by a single
firm. Firms have to obtain a license to use the blueprints for producing a brand from the R&D sector
before production starts . Once the license is acquired  a firm can produce as much quantity ofX(j)
it wishes according to the following Cobb-Douglas technology
X(j)  =  A,  [Kx(j)]  [L(j)]l",  A  > 0,  1 >  I > 0,  j  [0,M],  (5)
where  Lx(j)  and  KX(j)  denote  labor  and  capital  used  to  produce  X(j),  respectively.  The  above
specification restricts the technology to be the same in all intermediate inputs sectors.
R&D sector. Research and development are undertaken in this sector. Firms use labor, capital,  and
a public good (knowledge capital) to produce new blueprints and thereby add to the set of available
7This is the famous Dixit and Stiglitz 's (1977)  formulation of horizontal product differentiation. Ethier (1982)
reinterpreted equation (5) as a production function instead of a utility function as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
6brands.  So, product development in the R&D sector evolves according to
M  = AK.L  M,  A.  >  0,  1 > 8  >  0,  (6)
where a dot over a variable stands for the time derivative of that variable, Km is capital,  Lm is labor
used in R&D sector, and M, the measure of differentiated  inputs, is assumed to be proportional to
knowledge capital. We choose units of measure appropriately such that the factor of proportionality
is one.
Environmental quality. To avoid adding another state variable to the system, we model the quality
of the environment  as a flow  variable. We  offer two formulations.  First,  environmental  quality is
determined by the following geometric index
Q  = AE  E,  AQ  >  0,  y  E  <  0,  (7)
where  Ey and E,  denote total  emissions  from sectors Y and Z, respectively.  Emission  levels  are
assumed to be proportional to the respective aggregate  quantities  of Y and Z produced.  One can
think of Y as denoting agriculture which contaminates  the water system and Z as industry which
generates  air pollution.  The quality of the environment  is, therefore,  given by the inverse of the
geometric  index  of water  and  air  pollution.  In  the  second  approach,  we  assume  that  use  of
differentiated intermediate inputs generates pollution which impairs the ability of people to enjoy the
quality of the environment.  We choose the following functional form to describe this
Q  =  [fX(t)(j)dj]-1,  >  0.  (7')
We assume agents are atomistic and take prices and the quality of the environment as given.
7Market  Structure. The markets for the two traded goods (Y and Z), labor, capital, and new designs
from the R&D sector are perfectly competitive. However,  each producer of a differentiated input sells
its output in an imperfectly competitive market.
I.  Equilibrium Analysis
We define equilibrium in the following way. An equilibrium is paths for prices and quantities such that
1.  Consumers makes consumption and asset accumulation decisions  treating prices,  interest
rate, and environmental  quality as exogenous functions of time.
2. Final output producers choose quantities of labor and capital taking output prices, prices
of primary and intermediate factors, and the measure of intermediate inputs as given.
3. Intermediate  inputs producers  maximize  profits taking  as given the price of labor  and
capital, final output prices, the downward-sloping demand for their products, the number of
differentiated  inputs, and the initial cost of obtaining a design.
4. Firms in the R&D sector choose labor and capital to create new designs taking as given the
price of new designs, prices of primary factors,  and the stock of knowledge as given.
5. All markets clear.
We assume that all agents have perfect foresight so that at each moment of time the entire
path of prices is known.  We will  also assume that our small economy operates within its cone of
diversification ruling out specialization in the production ofZ and Y.
Profit maximization in the final good sectors requires equating unit costs to prices. That is8,
8Intermediate inputs producers cannot price discriminate between sectors because the price elasticities of
demand are the same in the two sectors, see equation (12)  below. The unit cost functions in equations (8) and (9) are
derived as min wL L, + wk K+  pd Di s.t. (2) and Y = 1 for i =y, and s.t. (3) and Z= 1 for i=  z. That in equation (10)  is
8Py, =  Wk  w  (8)
PI  P2  P 3 P  =  Wk  WL  Pd  (9) PV  (9)
a  8-1
Pd=  If$Mpx(j)"-dj ]  (10)
where wk denotes the price of capital,  wL  is price of labor,  Pd is price of the index D, px(j) is price of
intermediate  inputs j, and py and  p,  are prices of commodity  Y and  Z, respectively. Notice that in
deriving  the  unit  cost  functions  we  have  chosen  the  constants  of the  production  functions
appropriately.
Equilibrium in the R&D sector requires  equating the price of a design to its unit cost. That
is,
e  1- 8
P.  W WL  (11)
A/M
where p.  is the price of a new design and Am' = Am  0  (1-0)1'.
Applying  Shephard's lemma  to the unit  cost function  in equation  (10),  we can  derive the
demand for Xk()  as
1  6  1
x,j) = pO)-'D,  [If  p,(s)6-'ds]  ,  i  = y,  z, j  e  [O,M].  (12)
Each firm in the intermediate goods sectors, acting monopolistically,  maximizes profits taking into
obtained by minimizing f0
Mp(i) X(i) di s.t. (4) and D = 1.account the demand functions in  equation (12).  Profits are maximized by following the mark-up over
marginal cost pricing rule
P  =  W  =  WL  v j E  [O,M].  (13)
b
Therefore,  price, quantity, and hence the level of profits are the same for all firms operating  in the
intermediate inputs sectors.  Using this fact in equation  (10)  yields
6-1
P,  = PM  ,   (10')
where px denotes the common equilibrium price in the intermediate  inputs sectors.
The cost functions in equations (8),  (9), (10'),  and (13)  can be solved for input prices. The
solutions for the price of labor and capital are given by
In this equilibrium we will assume that world prices and the rate of innovation, M/M, are constant
over time. Hence, equations (14)  and (15)  imply
PL  _*k  _z 3(1-6)  (16)
L  =  P.) 
p   1   M  (14)
- wi  8g  (16)(1
where  g  =  /M.  ThisM  with equation (11),  yields(15)
In  this equilibrium we will assume that world prices and the rate of innovation, M/M,  are constant
over time. Hence, equations (14)  and (15)  imply
10P.  [C(A-  8)  - 81 P1  . (17)
From  the  unit  cost  functions,  using  Shephard's  lemma,  we  obtain  the  following  input-output
coefficients:
P  p  P,  ,  P=  - PP
by  =  Lby  =,  ,  bb  =  n  ,  b  = 0P  ,by  =
Wk  Wk  Wk  Wk  WL
(18)
PZ  XPa  Py  Pz
bz =  p2 -P  b  =  (1-l)  P, bk-  = (1-0)-  , b  =  a"  ,  b  = p3
WL  WL  WL  Px  Px
where  by denotes per unit  input i used in the production of good j,  i = k, L, x and j = y, z, x, m.
Substituting these in the resource constraints, making use of the identity pxXM  = pd(D  + DO  = c3pyY
+  33pz Z, and rearranging gives
(ac+6al  )p y Y  + (P+an+  P3pZ + ep.Mg =  wkK  (19)
[Ca,+(1-  )a3]  pyY  + [P,+6(1-)P 13  PZ  + (1-6) pM g  =  WLL.  (20)
Since g, p,  and py are constant, equations (19)  and (20) suggest that both Y and Z grow at the same
rate of growth as that of wE  and wk. That is,
- 2;-  (1-g.  (21)
Y  Z  6
Adding equations (19)  and (20) and making use of some of the restrictions on the parameters yields
11[1-  a&(1 - )](pZ  + pY)  = wK  + wL  - p.Mg
Because firms are allowed to freely enter into and exit from R&D, in equilibrium,  the price
of a new design is equivalent  to the value of a firm in the intermediate  inputs sectors.  To maintain
asset market  equilibrium, the rate of return from holding equities (i.e. dividends plus changes in the
value of the firms) should be equal to the rate of return on a one period loan. Thus, in equilibrium the
following no-arbitrage condition is satisfied
S +   -=  r,  (23)
Pm  Pm
where  x denotes the profit  level of a firm  in the intermediate inputs  sectors, and  r is the rate of
interest on loans. Using the fact that x/pm=  (1-8)pxX/pm  = (1-6)pdD/Mpm= (1-6)a 3(pyY +PzZ)/Mpm,
with equations  (17)  and (22), we can rewrite the above condition as
(1-),  (wL + wK - pMg)  a,(1-8)
+ [  - l]g  = r.  (23') [1-a3(1-8)]  Mp.  8
Utilizing equation (1),  the consumer's  indirect utility function is
[(EQ  )/p  Pzl"0  1'1- - 1
V(E,pYpQ)  =  [(EQ)/p
(C  Cz  I-o  _  1




(22)where  E  stands for expenditure.  The  solution to the consumer's  problem  is given by solving the
following dynamic problem
Max  " V(E,pYp.,Q)  e-t  dt
{E(t))
s.t.  E  +  A(t)  =  ra(t) +  wK  +  wLL
where a(t) denotes nonhuman wealth at time t. Application of the Maximum Principles results in the
following relation
o-  - (-  o)=  r  - p.  (25) E  Q
Due to the nature of  the utility function, and because consumers have perfect information and rational
expectations (perfect foresight in this case),  changes  in the quality of the environment  affect the path
of consumption over time. It is interesting to note that even though consumers take Q as given, its
evolution affects their behavior. Notice that if o = 1 (i.e. the utility is of the logarithmic form) or if
the utility is additively separable  in Q, the second term in equation (25)  will disappear and so the
consumption path will not be affected by Q.
We assume that our small country cannot lend or borrow  from the outside world.  Hence,
,trade is always in balance
E  = pY  + pz.  (26)
Differentiating  equation (26) with respect to time and making use of equation (21)  gives
E  _  (1- 8))
-- =g.  (27)
E
13We can also combine equations (7) or (7')  and (21)  to obtain
- . (28)
if equation (7) applies or
Q _ (E  - 1)
- (28') Q
when  (7')  is the relevant  equation.  Substituting  equations  (27)  and (28)  into equation  (25)  and
rearranging yields
a 3(1-8)
r  =  p  + 1'  a  (29)
where T = o - p(1-o)(ey+E). If instead we use equation (28') we get r = p + T'  a3(1-6)g/6,  where
Y'  = o - p(1-o)(e-1)8/(1-6)Ea 3. Solving for wL/wk from equations (14)  and (15)  and combining
equations (11),  (23'), and (29) and rearranging gives the growth rate of innovation in terms of the
parameters of the model, endowments, and exogenous variables
8  1
AA .P'1 61 [(P)l-1K  +  L]  - p
Pg  P,  (30)
1  +  A  +  (7(F-1)
where A  = a3(1-6)/[1-a 3(1-6)]. If equation (7') applies, we will have  I'  instead of T in the growth
formula. It should be noted that the integral in the consumer's utility function is always finite provided
c3(1I-)(1-)g/6 < p. The transversality condition associated  with the consumer's problem ensures
the satisfaction of this inequality. The fact that we looked only for interior solution to the R&D sector
14problem implicitly imposes a restriction on the growth formula in equation (30):  growth has to be
strictly positive. We assume our parameters satisfy this and the condition required for boundedness
of the utility function. Both the numerator and denominator in equation (30) are taken to be positive.
In this model the effects of environmental  externalities are captured by the parameters - g(Ey
+ e)  if equation (7) applies or g(€-1)86/a 3(1-8)  if equation (7')  is the relevant equation. We adopt
the assumption  that the effects of environmental  externalities  are mild  relative to  expenditure  on
consumption i.e. 1 > - g(Ey + e)  if equation (7)  applies and 1 > gI(E-1)6/Ea 3(1-8)  if we have equation
(7')  instead.  In other words,  we assume  consumers  value consumption  more than environmental
quality.
Claim. If consumers value consumption more than environmental  quality, T > 0, and  , 7'
is greater,  equal  to, or less than one as a is greater,  equal to, or less than one; respectively.
Proof Rearrange the formulas for Y  and T' the result is obvious.
The comparative  static results of the growth rate are summarized by the following propositions.
Proposition  1. Growth is higher (i) the larger  is the country's endowment of K andL, (ii) the
more productive is R&D (higher  A'" ),  (iii)  the smaller the rate of  time preference, (iv) the larger
the elasticity of intertemporal  substitution (I/a), or (v) the smaller the elasticity of substitution (
lower 6) provided 7  s 19.
Proof The denominator in equation (30) is positive. Differentiating that equation with respect
to the relevant variable we get (i) ag/aK = A'm(py /pz) 1 ey" ~' ~P) /(denominator)  > 0, ag/aL =  A'm(py
/p  ((x-diP)  /(denominator) > 0;  (ii)  ag/9A'm = 1/(denominator) > 0;  (iii)  ag/ap = -1/(denominator)  <
9According to Lerner (1934) price minus marginal cost divided by price measures the degree of market power. In
our case, this is given by 1 - 8. Therefore, an increase in the degree of market power (i.e. lower 6)  increases growth.
150;  (iv)  ag/ao  =  [- g/(denominator)2  ]aW/ao. But aT/oa  >  0.  hence,  ag/ao < 0;  (v) dg/86 =
[denominator (numerator - A  ) + a3(TY-1)/8
2]/(denominator) 2, where 0  = (p, /p) 1-eoY(. 1-1) K +  (py
/p)-e/(•-p)  L. But 8A/56  < 0 and (numerator - AQ) > 0. Hence, ag/a6 < 0.
Proposition 2. With the source of environmental  externalities  as described  by equation (7),
environmental quality decays at a constant  rate along  the balanced  growth  path. If instead  pollution
is governed  by equation (7), environmental  quality decays, stays constant, or improves at a constant
rate as e is less, equal to, or greater  than one; respectively.
Proof.  See equation (28)  and (28').
II.1 The effects  of environmental externalities on growth
Let the quality of the environment be given by equation (7).  Then, taking environment into account
slows growth if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (1/o)  is greater than one. This can easily
be seen from the growth formula in equation (30). If agents ignore the effects of the environment  (i.e.
t = 0), the denominator of equation (30) will be smaller and hence growth will be higher. This result
implies that countries in which consumers care more about the effects of environmental  externalities
grow faster than those which don't. Moreover, growth is lower, the more profound are the effects
of  the environment on consumer's utility (i.e. lower g), provided a < 1. If a > 1, the opposite result
will be obtained: growth varies positively with agents care about the effects of environment. It may
be interesting to note that if a = 1 (i.e. the case of a logarithmic utility) or if the utility function is
additively separable, the environment doesn't affect the growth rate under the competitive conditions
assumed. Changes in the elasticities of environmental  quality with respect to pollution levels (ey and
e)  have the opposite qualitative effects  on growth compared to changes in Ct.  We have proved the
following proposition.
16Proposition 3. Care about  the environment slows, doesn't affect, or promotes  growth if and
only  if the elasticity of intertemporal  substitution (I/a)  is greater, equal to, or less than one;
respectively. If the quality of the environment is given by equation (7), the above results hold only
if E < 1. When e > 1, we obtain the opposite qualitative  result. If  e = 1, environment does not affect
growth.
To get a feeling of the importance of incorporating environment  in this endogenous growth
model follow this simple numerical  exercise. Let a3(1-6)/6  = 1, A'm = 0.075,  py = pz = L = K = 1, 6
= 1/3,  65 + eZ  = -1, 0 = 1.8,  and  p = 0.025. Choose g = 0 and use equation (30) to compute g as
2.17%. If p = 0.9, then g = 3.16%.  Therefore,  about  1% difference in growth rates across countries
can be explained by concern about the environment. Needless to emphasize, we could have chosen
the parameters in a way that would magnify this disparity.
111.2 The terms of trade effects
Assume that commodity Y is exported and Z is imported. Normalize the initial terms of trade to one,
and to neutralize the effects of endowments,  suppose K = L. Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let R&D be capital  intensive (i.e. 0> 1/2).  Then an improvement in the terms
of trade (i.e. higher  p, /p)  enhances (retards)  growth if Y is less (more) capital  intensive than Z.
Proof. If we  differentiate  equation  (30)  and  use  the  above  restrictions  we  arrive  at:
sign[dg/a(py/p)] = sign[(a 1 - P3  ) (0 - 1/2)]. The proof follows immediately.
The intuition behind this result is simple.  Stopler-Samuelson  theorem suggests a fall in wk and
a rise in wL as a result of the rise in py/pa if Y is less capital intensive than Z. Hence the demand for
capital in R&D (which is capital intensive) increases and so does the growth rate. The above result
suggests that improvements in the terms of trade boosts growth only if whatever factor intensity R&D
17has, exportables have less of it than importables. This can be seen more clearly if we consider the two
polar cases (i) R&D is extremely labor intensive (i.e 6 = 0) and (ii)  R&D is extremely capital intensive
(i.e.  0  =  1 ).  Substitute these values of 6 in the growth  formula and the result  would become
transparent.
Now let us relax our assumption on endowments and initial terms of trade. We obtain the following
more general result.
Proposition  5. If exportables are more (less) capital intensive than importables, then an
improvement in the terms of trade  promotes (retards)  growth if and only if the capital-labor  ratio
in the R&D sector is less (more) than the endowments ratio of capital  to labor.
Proof. Differentiating  the  growth  rate  with  respect  to  the  terms  of trade  we  get:
sign[ag/a(py/p)]  = sign{(a,  - P, ) [K(p, /p) 1 /(" 1-l )  - 6/(1-6)]}.  But in equilibrium,  (py  /p•i)/(1-1P)  =
WL/Wk  and 6 = wkKm  and wL Lm = (1-6).  Therefore,  sign[ag/a(py/p)]  = sign[(a 1 - P  ) (K/L -Km
/Lm)].
This result suggests an easy empirical test for the terms of trade effects  on growth. It requires
data on factor intensities in the import, export, and R&D sectors and the scarcity of capital relative
to labor.
II.3 The effects  of trade on growth
There are at least two approaches which we can follow in order to analyze the effects of trade on
growth. The first approach requires computing both the autarky and trade equilibria and comparing
the growth rates. The second approach utilizes some results from trade theory about the properties
of the two equilibria to investigate the effects of trade. Trade theory tells us that the relative price of
the  imported  commodity  (suppose  it  is  Z)  is  always  higher  in  autarky  than  in  the  free  trade
18equilibrium. Then the effects of opening this economy to  international trade can be investigated by
analyzing the effects of a rise in the relative price (p/p)  on the equilibrium  studied above. While the
first approach is more direct and quantitatively oriented, the second one is more appealing because
it doesn't require computing the autarky equilibrium in order to derive qualitative results about the
effects of different trade regimes.  Since in this section we are interested only in qualitative results we
opt for the second approach.'" Then according to Proposition 5, trade enhances growth if exportables
are more (less) capital intensive than importables and the post trade capital-labor ratio in the R&D
sector is less (more) than the ratio of the endowments of capital to labor.
111.4  The effects  of trade on environment
Like that on growth, the effects of trade on the environment  can be analyzed by considering a rise in
the relative price p/p,. Using equation (7), the quality of the environment can be written as
Q =  AQYi  Z M  (7")
where  i = yM ( 1 -8)"" • a and Z = ZlM ( 1- 8 ) 38.
Differentiating equation (7") with respect to py and converting the resulting equation in elasticity form
we arrive at
Q =  [e•,,  +  6. +   (, 1-8)  (31)
where C(  is commodity Ys price elasticity of variable i, i = Z, Y, Q. From equations (14),  (15),  (19),
and  (20) we can derive expressions for  (y,  zy,  and  ,my.  The  signs of these expressions  are, in
general, ambiguous. Intuition suggests  C, is positive and  (y  is negative. Even if this is true the sign
o~In  the numerical exercise of Section VI, we follow the first approach.
19of  y  is still ambiguous. Notice that the last term involves  Cmy which may be positive or negative.
Notice also that this term (Cy  = t g  gy)  becomes dominant  as time goes on. Therefore, if Cm  is
positive (the case where trade enhances growth),  in the long-run trade worsens the quality of the
environment. If, however, this country decides to open its borders for trade in period zero, then trade
improves the quality of the environment if and only if Cyy  < - e~ /Ey  y. But the environment will
continue to deteriorate at a higher or a lower rate thereafter depending on whether trade enhances
or retards growth.  So,  the time at which  a country opens its boarders  to trade also matters.  The
second formulation of the environment also gives rise to ambiguous results.
11.5 The welfare  effects  of trade: Gains or losses?
In this equilibrium trade has two opposing effects on welfare.  On one hand we have the usual static
gains from trade. Using Roy's identity, the fall in the price of the imported good can be shown to
result in higher utility. It may also  have positive dynamic  effects  on welfare through the growth
channel.  On the other hand trade may worsen the quality of the environment and hence negatively
affect welfare. The overall welfare effect of  trade is, therefore, ambiguous. It depends  on which effect
is more dominating.  In a later exercise we will use numerical values to investigate those effects.
IV. The social planner's problem
The social planner's problem for this country can be written as
Max  f0o"  V(E,py,p,Q) e p t dt
s.t.
(2),(3),(4),(5),(6),(7  or 7'),(26)
Xy(j)  + X(j) = X(0), j e [O,M]
20Ly + L, + IM Lx(i)  di + L,= L
Ky,+  KYz+  f M K(i) di + K= K
M(0) > 0 given.
The optimal growth rate of innovation is given by (the derivations are in Appendix I)
3(1 -6•)  A / Pep-.jP  _.)u1-P1) A  (.  '-)  [(!Y  '  K  +  L]  - p
g  =  o(  -)(32)
6
if equation (7)  applies or
'-  Y)  K + L]  - p
Pz  Pz
g=  P  Z(32')
A 7 +  (P'-  I)
6
where  A' = [(e-1)/E  + a3(1-8)/6]/(1-p),  if equation (7')  is the relevant equation.
Proposition 6.  The optimal  growth rate has the  followingproperties.  It is higher (i) the larger
the country's endowment of labor  and capital, (ii) the more productive is R&D, (iii) the smaller the
rate of time preference, (iv) the less consumers value the effects of the environment (lower p)
provided a < 1,  (v)  the larger  the intertemporal  elasticity of substitution (smaller a), or (vi) the
smaller the elasticity of substitution between any two differentiatedproducts  (smaller 6).
Moreover, what we have said about the terms of trade effects in competitive equilibrium  also applies
here.
If a3(1-6)/6  = 1,  the equilibrium presented above is of the balanced growth type in which Y,
Z, and M grow at the same rate. This is obvious from equations (21):  if a 3(1-6)/6  = 1, we will have
21Y and Z growing at the rate g. If this condition is satisfied and if equation (7) applies, we will have
g < gm i.e. the decentralized growth rate is always smaller than the Pareto optimal one. To see that
we just need to note that 0 < A  < a 3(1-6)/8  = 1. To prove that A < a3(1-6)/6,  suppose the opposite:
A >_  a3(1-6)/8.  This implies 6  > 1 - a 3(1-6),  or a 3 > 1 an obvious contradiction.  Therefore,  equation
(30) has a bigger denominator and a smaller numerator than equation (32).  This also suggests that
if  F = 1 +  A - a3(1-6)/86  0, g < gm.  This implies that for the market rate to be higher than the
Pareto optimal rate a necessary condition would be r  < 0. But 9T /86  < 0. So for the market rate to
be higher than the optimal rate, it is necessary to have strong monopoly power. More generally we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 7.  The decentralized  equilibrium growth rate is less than (equal to) [greater
than] the Pareto  optimal  rate  if and  only if zero is less than (equal  to) [greater  than] F[ac(1-  6) D/6
- p] + a(l- 6)  (1-I)/6.
Proof. Subtract equation (32) from equation  (30). You will get sign (g - g  ) = - sign {r
[a 3(1-6)0/8 - p] + a 3(1-8)0T  (1-P)/6}.
Proposition (7) reveals that the market rate tends to be bigger than the optimal rate the smaller
is  6  and  . But  Y  is smaller the  more strong are  the  effects of environmental  externalities  on
consumers welfare i.e. the bigger is -p(Ey + e)  provided  o > 1. Therefore, the market rate is bigger
than the optimal  rate,  the  larger is the degree  of monopoly power and the more important  are
environmental  externalities.
Many studies in the literature are concerned about whether growth and the environment  are
substitutes or complements. Because they implicitly view environment as an end in itself, their natural
conclusion would be growth should grind to a halt if it harms the environment.  In this paper and
22economics more generally,  neither growth nor the environment are ends in themselves, but they are
means  to  achieve  an  end  (i.e.  enhance  welfare).  So,  even  if (as we  specify  here)  growth  and
environment  are substitutes  (see equation (7)),  the above proposition tells us how it is possible to
have the competitive growth rate being below the optimal rate and  so optimal preservation  of the
environment requires measures to enhance growth. We can look at this issue from a different angel.
As we have  shown  earlier,  if a  >  1, then  growth varies  positively with g.  In  other words, the
important implication is valuing the environment  and growth go hand in hand.
The  second  approach  to  the  environment  teaches  a  very  important  lesson  about  the
relationship  between  innovation,  growth,  and environmental  quality. Technological  change  in this
economy enables agents to use less and less of the dirty intermediate inputs and  so,  depending on
whether  these  intermediate  inputs  substitute  perfectly  in  generating  pollution,  the quality  of the
environment can be sustained at a constant rate.
V. Policy  Implications
The divergence  of the decentralized  equilibrium growth path from the Pareto optimal one calls for
government  intervention.  As  expected,  however,  not  all  kinds  of government  intervention  are
desirable.  In this section we attempt to find some 'desirable' policy instruments as well as showing the
danger behind choosing the wrong type and magnitude of policy variables.  We hasten to note that
because the relationship between the competitive and optimal growth path is ambiguous it is easy to
make mistakes in choosing  a desirable policy instrument. To elaborate,  suppose the optimal growth
rate is below the decentralized growth rate. Then all growth-boosting policies are among the wrong
choice set.
23For the rest of the paper we analyze only the case where the environment is given by equation
(7). Our analyses in this section are restricted to the case of balanced growth equilibrium. For this
purpose we take the condition  a3(l-8)/8  = 1 to be satisfied.  As has been shown earlier, under this
condition, the decentralized  balanced growth path is always below the Pareto  optimal  path.  This
suggests that we should consider as candidates for 'desirable' policy instruments only those which
boost growth. It is natural to look for first-best policies. These are by definition designed to remove
all distortions. They include a subsidy to R&D sector to internalize the externality from knowledge
creation, a subsidy to the intermediate inputs sector to equate marginal cost to prices, and an emission
tax on final output producers to internalize pollution externalities. With optimal choice of levels of
these taxes and subsidies, the optimal allocations can be attained through a decentralized competitive
market driven equilibrium. Instead of analyzing first-best policies we will concentrate  only on second-
best policies. There are two reasons for this choice. First, in reality not all these instruments (four of
them in this case) will be available for policy makers. There may be only a subset of them at their
disposal. We are, therefore,  left in the realm of second-best world.  Second, if growth is the most
important variable of interest, only one policy instrument is needed to align the two growth paths.
All the policies considered below are sustained through lump-sum transfers. We adopt the
following  strategy in calculating  optimal policies. We introduce the policy change and compute the
policy-ridden growth rate. Then we equate that rate with the optimal growth rate and solve for the
optimal level of the policy variable.
(1) A subsidy to R&D. Suppose the government pays an ad valorem subsidy,  Xm, to the R&D sector
per each new design. This has obvious immediate effects on growth since it increases M. The optimal
subsidy rate is given by
24x
m   a[Q(lf- 1)+  ]  -.  (33)
(2) Trade policy:  (i) An subsidy to Y. Let commodity Y be less capital intensive than Z and to make
the  calculations  simple  assume  R&D  is  extremely  capital  intensive  (i.e.  0  =  1).  Suppose  the
government  pays an ad valorem  subsidy,  X,,  to the exporters of good Y.  The objective of  the
subsidy would be to encourage more production of Y and less of Z (which is more capital intensive)
so that less of it is produced domestically  and consequently less of capital is used in Z and more of
it will be available to R&D.  An excise subsidy to the producers of Y would do the same. The optimal
subsidy rate would be
p  (A+()gm  +  p  - AK  PiK-i
S =  ( pAL  '-  ]   -1  (34)
(ii)  A subsidy to the importers  of Z can achieve the same objective  and so is an excise tax on the
production of Z. Let Xz denote the subsidy rate. Its optimal rate should be set to
pX  (A  +Y)gm  +  p  - AK  i1-Pi
x  p  =-(  A--  ]  . (35) pz  AL
(3) Tax on capital used in Z: this tax has the same qualitative effects as a fall in the price of good Z.
The optimal tax rate is given by
x  = (),  (A  +f)g m + p - AK  (36)
py  AL
(4)  Output subsidy to the intermediate inputs sector.
Suppose the government decides to pay an ad valorem subsidy to each producer of Xi. The optimal
25subsidy rate would be
x=_ (Pyg__  - 1  (37) XI  (-g  l--.X1  8)'a3-S  9Pg.)
(5)  Environmental policy.  Since the objective is discourage production of Z and force it to release
more capital resources to R&D we consider only the effect of a per unit emission tax,  T,,  on sector
Z. The effects of this tax are similar to a fall in the price ofZ. Optimal tax on emissions from Z should
be set equal to
(A  +  l  )g,+p  - AK  P1  (1-
T ,  = p  "-  P-[  AL  ]  (38)
VI. Numerical Application
We maintain most of the specifications  in the previous sections.  The only change we make here is to
introduce pollution abatement and its relation to innovation. Total amount of emissions of each sector
is determined by
E,  =  AY  - E,.  A,  >0  (39)
E,  = AZ  - E,  A  >  0  (40)
where Eck is pollution controlled by sector k, k = y, z, and all other variables are defined earlier.
Abatement technologies  are given by
E,  =  A.,KyL  M,  v, >  0,  v  +  vL  <  1,  i  =  1,  2  (41)
26Ex  = A,  KvL z  VM,  v t>  0,  vl  + v ,  <  1,  i  =  1, 2
We assume abatement technologies in both sectors exhibits  decreasing returns to scale.  This
specification gives rise to increasing marginal cost functions for controlling pollution. It also  suggests
that cost curves drift downward as more technological  knowledge (higher M in this case) becomes
available.  This seems to be a plausible assumption that is implicit in the few studies which address the
issue of pollution abatement and technical change (e.g., Dowing and White,  1986 and Magat,  1978).
Incorporating  pollution control in this model  adds more reality to our story but it doesn't
come without cost. We couldn't find a closed form solution. We resort to numerical  analysis. For this
purpose  we need to have  numerical  values for certain  important  parameters. Our choices for the
parameters of the model are given in Table  1 in Appendix II.  Several assumptions are hidden behind
these  values.  First, a3(1-5)/6  = 1. Thus the resulting  equilibrium  of the balanced  growth type in
which Y, Z, E, M, and  1/Q all grow at the same constant rate.  Second,  aI > 01 indicating that sector
Y is more capital intensive than sector Z. Third, R&D is assumed to be capital  intensive (since 0 =
0.9 > 1 - 0 = 0.1)  whereas intermediate inputs sectors are labor intensive (because qr  = 0.1). Fourth,
controlling pollution in sector Y requires a capital intensive technology whereas pollution abatement
in sector Z is carried through a labor intensive technology.
Our previous analysis suggests that if Y is the imported commodity,  the above restrictions
imply trade promotes growth. It also suggests that the decentralized growth path is below the optimal
path.  Even though the  current  model  is  different  ( it  is  an extension  of the previous  model  by
incorporating pollution abatement), we conjecture these results will  still hold. The model is solved,
using Mathematica,  for three steady state equilibria:  autarky, trade, and Pareto optimal allocations.
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(42)The  solutions for some variables of interest  are  given  in Table  2  and their behavior overtime  is
depicted in Figures 1-6 in Appendix II. It should be noted that the thick lines represent Pareto optimal
equilibrium, dashed lines stand for autarky equilibrium,  and the thick lines denote trade equilibrium.
As expected trade promotes growth since the growth rate under trade is greater than that
under autarky. Both growth rates are, however, smaller than the Pareto optimal rate. Trade worsens
the quality of the  environment. This  can be seen more clearly from Fig.  2.  The overall  effects on
welfare of  opening the economy to trade are positive: welfare under trade is higher than welfare for
a closed economy. Not surprisingly, welfare is maximized under Pareto equilibrium. Under trade the
economy consumes more than it produces of commodity Y and so imports Y and exports Z.
Figures 7-8 depict the effects of environmental  policy on growth. As it is clear from Figure
7, growth increases monotonically with pollution taxes on sector Y. This should be expected in light
of  the fact that Y is more capital intensive than Z, and the tax forces it to release more capital so as
to be used in R&D which is capital intensive. An emission tax on sector Z has the opposite effect.
This is clear from Figure 8.
VII. Conclusions
In this  paper  we  have  developed  an  endogenous  growth  model  of a  small  open  economy  that
incorporates the welfare effects of environmental quality and its relation to pollution and pollution
abatement  activities.  Several  conclusions  emerge from the analysis  of this model.  First, long-run
growth increases with (i)  the country's endowments,  (ii)  the degree of openness provided whatever
factor intensity R&D has, exportables have less of it than importables,  and (iii) the degree of market
power of patents' holders. Second, the effects of the environment  on growth depend on the elasticity
28of intertemporal substitution of consumption. If it is greater than one, environment slows growth. If
it is, however, less than one, environment increases growth.  It is worth mentioning that the empirical
literature puts the elasticity ofintertemporal  substitution below one. Concerns about the environment
can  explain the  large differences  in growth rates  across  countries.  Third, the effects  of trade on
environment  and welfare are ambiguous.  They depend on price elasticities of supply of traded goods,
the terms of trade effects on growth, and pollution intensities. Numerical exercises,  however,  suggest
trade worsens the quality of the environment but improves welfare. Fourth, because there is a positive
externality from knowledge creation and negative externality from pollution, the competitive growth
rate can be greater or smaller than the Pareto optimal rate. In one razor edge equilibrium,  the two
rates are equal. In the balanced growth equilibrium, the decentralized  growth rate is below the Pareto
optimal rate.  The market rate of growth is likely to be greater than the optimal rate the larger the
degree of monopoly power and the stronger the effects of environmental  externalities. Many policy
instruments can be used to align the two growth paths. The choice of the policy variable depends on
the relationship between the Pareto optimal and market rates of innovation. If the former is greater
than the latter, it is imperative to design policies that increase the profitability ofR&D and decrease
the profitability of sectors which compete more intensively with R&D for resources. We analyzed two
ways in which technological change affects pollution. In the first, technological  change increases the
stock of knowledge  and that  makes  it  less  costly for  firms to  control  pollution.  In the  second,
technological change augments productivity and hence reduces the need for polluting inputs.
29Appendix I: The social  planner's problem
Case (1): Environmental  quality is given by equation (7). In an optimal allocation all the quantities:
X(j), X(j), and Lx(j)  will be the same for all i = y, z and j E  [O,M].  This enables us to rewrite the social
planner's problem as
Max  Jo" V(E,py,p,Q)  e-'tdt
s.t.
(2),  (3), (6), (7),  (26)
Dy + Dz = XM(1 i-Y
X = AKx'Lxl,-
L =Ly+  L+ L +Lm
K = K, + Ky+  K, +
M(O) > 0 given.
where L. and K. denote labor and capital used in all intermediate inputs sectors, respectively.
The current value Hamiltonian of this problem can be written as follows
EQ  1- [  _]  -1
H  =  +  P.(pyY*+pzZ-E)  +  PQ(AQY  Z  - Q)  +  ry(AyKy  'LyD  Y)  +
1-a
r.(AzKPLP  DI-Z)  +  pd(XM ('Y 1 6-D-D)  + w(L-LY-L-L-Lm)  +
i(K-Ky-K -K  -Ka)  + xAm K  Lm M  +  x (AKLq - X),
where  pN,  ry,  r  px  ,  Pd,  Wk,  WvL,  and  X denote  the  shadow  prices  associated  with  the  relevant
constraints.F.O.Cs are
(1)  H  = p  +  -
=  0
(2)  paH  +  =  - rP  = 0
dE
(4)  M-I  =E 1-0Q"(t-o)--  _  .0
aQ
rs  ryY  _  0 ai-  rY
aD,  D
(6)  aH  r
8K 1   K,
rH  rY  _
(8)  = 6  - w  = 0 (9)  aH  x  (A.l)
SKx  KS
(10)  = 




(12)  -a  =  p  (---  - =  0
8 z   Lz
(14)  = (1-8 )M  = 0 8Lz  LZ (14)  7 Lw  = aLM  La
S  1-  _
(15)  - = PM  -~  = 3X
(16)  i  =  pX - MD  M
&  M  M
We find it instructive to compare these optimality conditions to some of the competitive equilibrium
conditions. If we substitute the demand for labor and capital from equations  (A. 1.5 - A. 1.15)  in the
production function for Y, Z, X, and  Mi we arrive at the following
6-1  - _-8 - 1-0 -"  -"  :  '  (A.2)
r,  =  wk  WL  Pd  r,  =  WWL  P,  dP=  W  'WL  Pd  =  M  X  - A.M
Compare these to equations (8), (9), (10'),  (11),  and (13).  We see here the social planner adjust pricesto account for externalities and noncompetitiveness.  The noncompetitiveness  is corrected  for in the
equation for px. Here the marginal cost of producing the X is equated to the shadow price of X. There
is no mark-up  over marginal cost as in the market  solution. To see  more clearly how pollution is
corrected  manipulate equations (A. 1.1  - A. 1.4) to get an identity that is valid if
r,  =  [l1(  ey+e)]p.py  and  r,  =  [1+(eY+e)p]p.p  (A.3)
So, foreign prices of Y and Z are adjusted for pollution externalities.
Let M grows at the constant rate g,  and both Y and Z grow at the rate g (not necessarily
constant).  The above  equations,  with the fact that  sectoral  allocations  for  labor  and capital  are
constant in all sectors and equations (A. 1.3), (A. 1.7), and (A. 1.8) imply
WL  Wk  (A.4)
w L   w k
where Y = o + (1-o)P.(E+rl) andg is given by
303(1-5) S= ---- g.  (A.5)
Equations (A.2), (A.4), and (A.5)  can be combined to obtain
.[  - l]gm. (A.6)
Using  equations  (A.1.5  - A.1.15)  in the resource  constraints  and rearranging  gives the national
income asrYY  + rZ +  XMg.  = wLL  +wkJ.
This result with equation (A.5) enables us to rewrite equation  (A. 1.16) as
x  (1-8)a3  /  w  , - = P - - Am-{(L)[L  + (-)K]-  g }.  (A.8)
Swk  WL
From (A.3)  and the cost functions in (A.2) we can obtain (w/wL) = (p/p)1Y"(-p1).  Combing equations
(A.6) and (A.8) and making use of this result we arrive at the growth rate of innovation in terms of
the parameters of the model and exogenous variables as given by equation (32) in the text.
Case (2): Environmental  quality is given by equation (7). The current value Hamiltonian would be
the same except for one modification:  equation (7') requires Q = Aq XlM(E -' ' . The equations that
need to be changed in the F.O.Cs are
(1')  OH  _
Oy (li  =  pePy  - r  O  =
(2)  H  _  PeP-  r  =  O az
(15/)  OH  (Dy  Dz)  pQ  (A.1')
(1'6  - = P~d-Px  =  0 ax  x  X
-PQ  (1-8)  (Dy+Dz)  PQQ
(16)  i  =  p  - - Pd
eM  M  X  M
The cost function will be given as before by the equations in (A.2) except for Pd.  Using equations
(A. 1.1', 2'), (A. 1.3-6),  and (A. 1.15') we get the following relation for pd
Pd  =  M  a  (A. 10)
«3-P
Since  sectorial demands for labor and capital are constant in steady state X is also constant.  This
implies  that  Q grows  at  (e-1)gn/e.  Manipulating  equations  (A.1.1'),  (A.1.2'),  (A.1.3),  (A.1.4),
(A.7)differentiating the resulting expression with respect to time, and using the fact that E grows at a 3(1-
8)g/68 with the last result we obtain
.-.  --  gM  (A.10)
where  ' = o - a  (1-o)(e-1)8(1-6)Ea3.
equations  (A. 1.1')  and (A. 1.2')  tells us that ry/r  =  py/p.  Using this with the cost functions  gives
(wk/WL)  = (py/pz)/(• 1 l). Hence,  both wk and  wL  grow at the same rate  which we  can obtain  by
differentiating equation (A. 1.7) with respect to time and observing that Ky is constant in the steady
state. Thus,
L  Wk  3(  )  
(A.  11)
WL  Wk  6
which with the cost function for R&D sector yields
- (1-T')•1-  - 1.  (A.12)
Ix  6
Equation (A.  1.15') can be manipulated as follows. pX = - PQQ + pd(Dy + D)  = - pQQ + a3(rY+ rzZ).
But from equations (A.1.1'), (A.1.2'), (A.1.3), and (A.1.4) we get pQQ =  gppE =  t(ryY+ rZ). Then
pxX  = (a3 - tg)(  ryY+ rZ). From the resource constraint we will be able to get: wkwL  - XMg  =
pxX  + (1-a 3 )( ryY+  rzZ)  =  (1-[)(  ryY+ rZ). Using this result in equation (A. 1.16') we get
S,/(WkK  +WLL)
--  -g-  p  - g  g,  (A.13)
where A'  = [(E-1)/E + a3(1-8)/5]/(1-t). Equating (A.12) and (A. 13)  and rearranging we obtain the
growth rate as in equations (32') in the text.Appendix H: Tables and Figures
Table  1: Parameters.
4  p  p  e  ,  A  a  a  a3  A  P  P3  3  A2  6
.5  .5  1.2  .47  -.5  -.5  1  .5  .25  .25  2.8  .25  .5  .25  2.8  .2  .1
A,  Aw  ,,  v  ,,  v  ,,  A  A  0,  6  Am  p,  p,  t,,  T,  A  K  L
2  3  .25  .1  .2  .15  1  1  .8  .25  1  1.6  .03  .02  1.3  4  1Table 2:  Steady State Values.
1Variables with superscript 0 are constant over time, with + are growing at the common growth rate, and those
with a minus superscript are growing at negative the growth rate.
Variables"  Autarky  Trade  Pareto Optimal
Equilibrium  Equilibrium  Equilibrium
Growth Rateo  .00129  .0493  .3805
Output ofY,  1.8467  1.4745  1.2303
Output ofZ,  1.2265  1.5168  .6809
Environmental Qualify  .2797  .2823  .5282
GNP +   3.6954  3.9734  3.1194
Emissions from Y  '3.5618  2.8139  2.1131
Emissions from Z  '3.5869  4.4571  1.6957
Emissions Controlled by Y+  .1316  .135  .3475
Emissions Controlled by Z!  .0926  .0932  .3471
Interest Rateo  .4716  .5341
Price of Capital+   .2777  .2461
Price of Labor+   1.5522  1.7726
Price of a New Design0   1.566  1.4698
Consumption ofY+  '1.8467  1.9507  1.1599
Consumption ofZ+  1.2265  1.2191  .7249
Welfareo  -.4934  -.3171  -.0348Log Y
Fig. 3: Aggregate Output of Y
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